Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Citation

Nozick, R. (2013). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books. Foreword by Thomas Nagel. First published 1974.

Chapter Summary

The book has three parts and ten chapters and runs to 400 pages in the 2013 edition (the 1974 edition has 367). Its opening sentence holds that individuals have rights and that there are things no person or group may do to them without violating those rights. Part I defends the minimal state against the anarchist, Part II argues that no more extensive state can be justified, and Part III offers a framework for utopia that Nozick presents as equivalent to the minimal state. The publisher describes it as written in response to John Rawls's A Theory of Justice; it won the 1975 National Book Award. Not every chapter is named below.

Foreword to the 2013 edition

The 2013 reissue carries a new foreword by the philosopher Thomas Nagel. Nagel had earlier published an article on the book, "Libertarianism without Foundations" (1975), which the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy cites on the question of the book's foundations.

Part I, Chapters 2–4: The State of Nature; Moral Constraints and the State; Prohibition, Compensation, and Risk

Part I is titled "State-of-Nature Theory, or How to Back into a State without Really Trying". It asks the question Nozick treats as the fundamental one in political philosophy, whether there should be any state at all, and answers the individualist anarchist who says even a minimal state is unjustified. It does so with an invisible-hand explanation: starting from a state of nature, protective associations arise, one becomes dominant, and a minimal state follows without anyone intending it and without violating anyone's rights. The rights and "side constraints" that frame the argument, based on the separateness of persons, belong to this part, and the title of Chapter 3, "Moral Constraints and the State", points there. Chapter 4 asks whether every action that crosses a boundary may be prohibited and answers that some may be permitted if compensation is paid. The remaining chapters of Part I are not named here.

Part II, Chapters 7–9: Distributive Justice; Equality, Envy, Exploitation, Etc.; Demoktesis

Part II is titled "Beyond the Minimal State?". Chapter 7 sets out the historical entitlement conception of justice in holdings and argues against end-state and patterned principles, with Rawls's difference principle as the main target; it includes the Wilt Chamberlain argument, discussed under the heading "How Liberty Upsets Patterns", and ends with thoughts on rectification. Chapter 8 answers the considerations offered for a more extensive state, including equality, equal opportunity, meaningful work, workers' control and exploitation, with a critique of Marxism. Chapter 9 builds an invisible-hand account of how a democratic totalitarian state could arise through only morally permissible steps.

Part III, Chapter 10: A Framework for Utopia

Part III consists of this one chapter. It argues that the minimal state is also inspiring, since it is akin to a framework in which voluntarily formed communities coexist and individuals may join or leave them. It distinguishes existential, missionary and imperialistic utopians, and offers a route to the minimal state that does not rest on the rights argued for in Parts I and II.

Key Concepts

Part I: The Minimal State

• Side constraints: absolute limits on what may be done to individuals, derived from their separate existence.
• Ultraminimal and minimal state: the stages of the invisible-hand account, from a dominant protective agency to a state that protects everyone.
• Compensation: the idea in Chapter 4 that some boundary crossings are permissible if due compensation is paid.

Parts II and III: Justice and Utopia

• Entitlement theory: the historical conception of justice in holdings, as opposed to end-state and patterned principles.
• Wilt Chamberlain argument: the thought experiment showing, in Nozick's view, how liberty disturbs patterned distributions.
• Demoktesis: the invisible-hand construction of a democratic state in Chapter 9.
• Framework for utopia: the structure of voluntary communities in Chapter 10.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• A sustained argument with a rival. The publisher presents the book as a response to Rawls, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry by Eric Mack says that Nozick presses the anti-consequentialist side of Rawls's work further, so that the two books can be read as a pair.
• Reach beyond the main thesis. Mack notes that the book contains many "rich and intriguing side discussions" beyond the four topics he treats, and the Hachette page lists its recognition: a 1975 National Book Award and a place among the Times Literary Supplement's 100 most influential books since the war.
• A distinctive structure. The three parts give three kinds of case for the minimal state: a rights-based defence against the anarchist, a critique of more extensive states, and a utopian route that does not depend on the first two.

Limitations

• The foundations of rights. It is, Mack writes, a commonplace that the book gives no foundation for its natural rights; Nozick himself says it offers no precise theory of their moral basis, and Nagel's 1975 review title makes the same point.
• Difficulty. Mack describes Chapter 4 as very complex. The book is a work of philosophical argument by thought experiment, and the publisher lists no study aids.
• A thin bridge to rights. Mack also judges that the step from the separateness of persons to strong individual rights is suggested in the book but not compellingly argued.
• A 1974 text. The 2013 edition adds a foreword, but the argument predates later discussions, such as those of group difference taken up in Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference.

Where It Fits in the Course

In the modern political thought list, Nozick is the libertarian counterpart to Rawls. A Theory of Justice develops the original position and the veil of ignorance to argue for justice as fairness, and Nozick's Part II engages its distributive principles. The usual order is Rawls first, then Nozick, which matches the site's note that some familiarity with Rawls helps.

Kymlicka's Contemporary Political Philosophy is a survey whose chapter on libertarianism reconstructs Nozick's entitlement theory and self-ownership principle, so reading that chapter first gives a map of the argument. Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference questions the distributive paradigm that dominated the theory of justice after Rawls and gives a different direction for the debate. Adam Swift's Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide, organised around political values, is a short and gentler route into the vocabulary of liberty, equality and justice that this book uses.

How to Use This Book

The book is for undergraduates who have already met Rawls, or who read it alongside a survey such as Kymlicka. The publisher presents the reissue as an introduction to Nozick for a new generation of readers, but in practice it assumes a willingness to follow philosophical argument.

• Order: read the foreword, then Part I, concentrating on the account of rights and side constraints (Chapter 3) and the invisible-hand argument.
• Core: Chapter 7, which most of the philosophical commentary addresses, and Chapter 10 for the independent route to the minimal state.
• Optional: Chapter 4 is difficult and can follow a first pass; Chapter 8 (with its critique of Marxism) and Chapter 9 (on democracy) can be taken separately, for courses on Marxism or democratic theory.
• Alongside: the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Nozick's political philosophy, for orientation and objections.
• Practice: reconstruct the Wilt Chamberlain argument in numbered steps and say which premise a defender of Rawls would reject.