Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide

Citation

Ravenscroft, I. (2005). Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide. Oxford University Press.

Chapter Summary

The book runs to about 200 pages: an introduction, twelve chapters in four parts (What are mental states?; Mind as machine; Mind in a physical world; Consciousness), and back matter consisting of paper-writing tips, a glossary, a list of useful resources, references and an index. The introduction says it is primarily intended for undergraduates but may also help graduate students wanting a quick overview of the field. Each chapter ends with a numbered summary and suggestions for further reading, and the publisher also mentions discussion or self-assessment questions. Ravenscroft writes informally, often illustrating points with an everyday character, "Bloggs", and states his own views at several points.

Chapter 1: Dualism

Substance dualism and property dualism are distinguished. The chapter examines Descartes's arguments from what can and cannot be doubted and from the mind's use of language and reason, and finds them wanting; it then raises objections to dualism, including the lack of any account of how soul and brain interact compared with what physics tells us. It also introduces epiphenomenalism, the view that physical properties of the brain cause nonphysical ones but not the reverse, illustrated by seeing a lion and running away.

Chapter 2: Behaviourism

The first physicalist theory comes in two forms. Methodological behaviourism, a rule for psychology that seeks laws linking stimuli to behaviour, is discussed through its history (Skinner's experiments with rats and pigeons) and the arguments for and against it; philosophical behaviourism, a claim about what mental states are, is examined through the arguments offered in its support.

Chapter 3: The identity theory

Mental state types are identified with brain state types on the model of scientific identities such as water and H2O. The chapter explains the type/token distinction, the problem of multiple realization, and the restricted and token identity theories developed in response, and classifies the identity theory as a form of reductive physicalism.

Chapter 4: Functionalism

Mental states are defined by the job they do, like a carburettor, which can be made of different materials. The chapter discusses Ned Block's "Blockhead", a machine that behaves intelligently by looking up a list of circumstances, and argues that the strong intuition that Blockhead has no mental states is compatible with, and even explained by, functionalism.

Chapter 5: Eliminativism and fictionalism

The chapter sets out Paul Churchland's arguments that folk psychology is a false theory, including the charge that it is a "stagnant research program", and recommends Churchland's 1981 paper and Stephen Stich's work as further reading; the title indicates that fictionalist views of folk psychology are also considered.

Chapter 6: The computational theory of mind

The mind is treated as a symbol-manipulating system, with symbols having syntactic and semantic properties. The chapter explains the aim of strong AI and gives a detailed treatment of Searle's Chinese room argument and replies to it, including Fodor's.

Chapter 7: Connectionism

An alternative model treats the mind as a connectionist network of input, hidden and output units trained by adjusting connections. The chapter explains how such networks work and surveys the evidence for connectionism as a theory of the mind, on which Ravenscroft offers his own assessment.

Chapter 8: Physicalism and supervenience

This chapter is explicitly definitional: it seeks a good definition of physicalism, settling on the view that mental properties supervene on physical properties, and explains it with the idea that a world physically identical to ours, with no further properties, would be a mental duplicate of it. Substance dualism is thereby excluded.

Chapter 9: Content

How can mental states be about things? The chapter discusses the causal and teleological theories of content and their problems, such as the "dogs-or-sheep" problem for the causal theory, and uses Putnam-style Twin Earth cases and Tyler Burge's work to introduce the distinction between wide and narrow content.

Chapter 10: Mental causation

The chapter focuses on the problem of causal exclusion (if a mental state is realized by a brain state, the brain state seems to do all the causal work) and the problem of the causal efficacy of content.

Chapter 11: Varieties of consciousness

Following Ned Block, the chapter distinguishes access consciousness from phenomenal consciousness and asks whether access is a function of phenomenal consciousness. Ravenscroft criticises Bernard Baars for slipping from one notion to the other and holds that we have hypotheses about access consciousness but almost no idea how phenomenal consciousness is achieved.

Chapter 12: Phenomenal consciousness

The final chapter covers qualia, Jackson's story of Mary, who learns what red looks like when she leaves her black-and-white room, absent and inverted qualia, pain-zombies, and Joseph Levine's explanatory gap. Ravenscroft finds the explanatory gap worrying and, following Block, says that no one has come close to bridging it.

Key Concepts

Part 1: What are mental states?

• Substance and property dualism: the mind as a nonphysical thing, versus nonphysical properties of a physical brain.
• Epiphenomenalism: the view that mental properties are caused by the brain but cause nothing themselves.
• Methodological versus philosophical behaviourism: a rule for doing psychology versus a theory of what mental states are.
• Type and token identity: identity of kinds of mental states with kinds of brain states, versus identity only of particular instances.
• Multiple realization: one mental state can be realized by different physical states.
• Folk psychology: everyday explanation of behaviour by beliefs and desires, which eliminativists claim is false.

Part 2: Mind as machine

• Syntax and semantics: the formal properties of symbols versus their meaning.
• Strong AI and the Chinese room: the claim that running the right program suffices for a mind, and Searle's argument against it.
• Connectionist network: a system of interconnected units that learns by adjusting connection strengths.

Parts 3–4: Mind in a physical world; Consciousness

• Supervenience: no mental difference without a physical difference, used to define physicalism.
• Wide and narrow content: content that depends on the environment versus content shared by physical duplicates.
• Causal exclusion: the worry that physical causes leave no work for mental causes.
• Access and phenomenal consciousness: information available for reasoning and report, versus what an experience is like.
• Explanatory gap: the apparent impossibility of explaining why a brain state feels as it does.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• Built for beginners. The book assumes no background, explains technical ideas through simple examples (the carburettor, Bloggs and the lion, Twin-Bloggs), and ends each chapter with a numbered summary. A cover endorsement describes it as accessible to the beginner and as standing apart from other introductory texts.
• Coverage of cognitive science. Part 2's chapters on the computational theory of mind and connectionism give a beginner's account of the models of mind behind artificial intelligence and cognitive science, each with a chapter of its own.
• Clear on its own position. Ravenscroft says where he stands, for example on Blockhead, on Baars's theory of consciousness and on the seriousness of the explanatory gap, so readers see arguments being evaluated rather than merely listed.
• Practical aids. Paper-writing tips, a glossary and graded further reading (the resources list marks some books as harder or denser than this one) make it usable for self-study.

Limitations

• Dated in places. Published in 2005, the book predates later work on topics such as embodied and extended cognition and the recent development of artificial intelligence; its discussion of AI centres on strong AI and the Chinese room.
• Compressed treatment of hard material. Supervenience, content and mental causation each get a single short chapter, and the book itself points to harder works, such as Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World, for the full arguments.
• Narrow range of topics. The contents contain no chapters on personal identity, free will, perception or other minds, which some philosophy of mind courses include.

Where It Fits in the Course

This is one of two introductions in the course that assume no prior philosophy. Amy Kind's Philosophy of Mind: The Basics is shorter and more recent and includes the question of how technology may change minds; Ravenscroft devotes whole chapters to the computational theory of mind, connectionism, content and mental causation. Either can serve as a first book. John Heil's Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction and Jaegwon Kim's Philosophy of Mind are fuller textbooks that cover the same main theories, from dualism through functionalism, with more detailed argument, and are the natural next step.

Part 3 prepares directly for Kim's Mind in a Physical World, which Ravenscroft himself recommends as harder but readable on mental causation and physicalism; Chapter 10's treatment of causal exclusion is the right background. Part 4, on access and phenomenal consciousness, qualia and the explanatory gap, is the best preparation in the course for David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind, which argues that consciousness cannot be explained reductively.

How to Use This Book

No prior study of philosophy or psychology is needed. Read the introduction and Part 1 in order, since each theory is presented as a response to problems with the one before. Parts 2, 3 and 4 can then be read in any order to suit the course: Part 2 for courses with a cognitive science component, Part 3 before any work on physicalism or mental causation, Part 4 before reading on consciousness. Chapters 1–4, 8 and 12 form a core for most courses.

After each chapter, check yourself against the numbered summary: if you cannot explain each point in your own words, reread the relevant section. Use the glossary for terms such as supervenience and multiple realization, and the paper-writing tips before your first essay. The further-reading suggestions, which indicate how difficult each recommendation is, are the best guide to what to read next on a topic.