Philosophy of Mind: The Basics

Citation

Kind, A. (2020). Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. Routledge. The Basics series.

Chapter Summary

The book is short: six chapters of between about 20 and 28 pages each, followed by a glossary, a bibliography and an index. Every chapter ends with a concluding summary or concluding remarks and a list of further reading. The first four chapters cover the classic theories of mind; the last two turn to animals, machines and technology.

Chapter 1: Mind and Mentality

An orientation chapter. It asks what philosophy of mind is, takes an inventory of mental life (the publisher's description names consciousness, thought and emotion as the central topics), explains how philosophers study the mind, and gives a rough overview of the theories of mind before previewing the rest of the book.

Chapter 2: Dualism

The chapter begins with Cartesian dualism, the view that mind and body are distinct kinds of thing, and then moves to contemporary versions of dualism, so that the position is presented as a live option rather than only a historical one.

Chapter 3: Physicalism

The longest of the theory chapters. It sets out the general motivations for physicalism, distinguishes its different versions, and then considers the general problems that all versions face.

Chapter 4: Functionalism

Functionalism is traced to its roots before being stated. The chapter then weighs the considerations in its favour against the problems it faces, following the same pattern of exposition followed by assessment used for dualism and physicalism.

Chapter 5: Machine Minds

The book turns from theories to the question of which beings have minds. It starts with animal mentality and then asks two separate questions about artificial systems: whether machines can think, and whether they can feel.

Chapter 6: The Future of the Mind

The final chapter looks at how technology might change minds: mind extensions, mind uploading and mind mergers, ending with a section that asks whether there is a real-life case of the last of these.

Key Concepts

Chapter 1: Mind and Mentality

• Inventory of mental life: a survey of the kinds of mental states, such as thoughts, sensations and emotions, that any theory of mind has to account for.
• Theory of mind: in this book's sense, a philosophical account of what minds are and how they relate to the physical world, of which dualism, physicalism and functionalism are the main families.

Chapters 2–4: Dualism; Physicalism; Functionalism

• Cartesian dualism: the view, from Descartes, that the mind is a non-physical thing distinct from the body.
• Contemporary dualism: present-day forms of dualism, treated in a section of their own.
• Physicalism: the view that the mental is ultimately physical; the chapter separates its general motivations, its different versions and the problems they share.
• Functionalism: the view that mental states are defined by the roles they play rather than by what they are made of.

Chapters 5–6: Machine Minds; The Future of the Mind

• Animal mentality: the question of which non-human animals have minds, the starting point for asking about machines.
• Machine thinking and machine feeling: two questions the book keeps apart, whether an artificial system could think and whether it could have feelings.
• Mind extension, uploading and merger: three ways technology might change or relocate a mind, each with its own section in the last chapter.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• Built for a first encounter. The publisher presents the book as a concise introduction with a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, and the contents bear this out: every chapter closes with a summary and a reading list. The Diversity Reading List entry rates it easy and recommends it for first-year undergraduates, including students who are not philosophy majors; Bence Nanay's endorsement, printed by the publisher, praises it as clear and accessible to undergraduates and even high-school students without dumbing down the core ideas.
• Even-handed structure. The theory chapters follow the same arc, from the motivations or roots of a view to the case for it and the problems against it, which makes it easy to compare positions and to see that no theory is presented as settled.
• Up-to-date scope. Two of the six chapters address questions often left out of short introductions: animal minds, whether machines could think or feel, and speculative questions about extending, uploading and merging minds. This makes the book a natural entry point for students who come to the subject from artificial intelligence or cognitive science.
• Written by a specialist. Amy Kind edited the twentieth- and twenty-first-century volume of Routledge's History of the Philosophy of Mind and has written an introduction to personal identity, so the brevity is a choice rather than a sign of thin expertise.

Limitations

• Breadth over depth. With about 150 pages of text for six chapters, each theory receives a chapter of roughly 20–28 pages. Students who need the detailed arguments for and against physicalism, or a sustained treatment of mental causation, will need a longer textbook.
• Some classic topics are not separate chapters. The contents give no chapter or section to behaviourism, the identity theory, intentionality or the problem of other minds as such; where these appear, they are folded into the chapters on dualism, physicalism and functionalism. Consciousness is listed by the publisher as a central concern, but it has no chapter of its own.
• The last chapter is speculative by design. Mind uploading and mind mergers are open questions rather than settled debates, so Chapter 6 is better used for discussion than as preparation for examination questions on the standard theories.

Where It Fits in the Course

In this course Kind's book is the shortest way in. It covers the same three theory families as Ian Ravenscroft's Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide, which explains the main theories in clear stages and then turns to cross-cutting problems such as consciousness and how mental states can be about things; Ravenscroft is the better choice for students who want those problems treated at greater length, while Kind is better for a quick map and for questions about animals, machines and technology.

After Kind, students move naturally to the two full textbooks: John Heil's Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, a survey from Cartesian dualism to contemporary views whose latest edition adds a chapter on artificial intelligence and in which Heil defends a position of his own, and Jaegwon Kim's Philosophy of Mind, a more rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of mind that closes by asking how much of the mental fits into a physical world. Kim's Mind in a Physical World and David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind are research monographs that defend particular positions, on mental causation and on consciousness respectively; Kind's chapters on physicalism and dualism give the background needed to start them.

How to Use This Book

The book assumes no previous philosophy and suits first-year students, students from psychology, computing or cognitive science, and general readers. Its length makes it possible to read in a week or two.

A practical reading plan:

• Core: Chapters 1–4, in order. Chapter 1's overview of the theories is the map for the rest, and the next three chapters build on each other.
• For AI-oriented readers: Chapter 5 after Chapter 4, since the question whether machines can think is closely tied to the functionalist idea that minds are defined by what they do.
• For discussion: Chapter 6, best read last and used for seminars or essays rather than as core content.
• Alongside: use the glossary while reading, and use the end-of-chapter reading lists to choose one or two primary texts per theory. For a course essay on any one theory, follow the relevant chapter with the corresponding chapters of Heil or Kim.

A useful exercise after each theory chapter is to write down the strongest argument for the view and the strongest problem against it before reading the concluding summary, then check the summary against the notes.