Philosophy of Language

Citation

Miller, A. (2018). Philosophy of Language (3rd ed.). Routledge.

Chapter Summary

The book has an introduction for students and nine chapters, about 466 pages in all. Every chapter is divided into numbered sections and closes with a chapter summary, study questions and a guide to further reading; a bibliography and index follow. The chapters trace a line of argument rather than a list of topics: each one starts from a problem left by the one before.

Introduction

A short student introduction, new in this edition, outlines why the philosophy of language matters and what the book aims to do. The publisher presents the whole book as a survey of twentieth-century and contemporary theories of meaning that combines the history of the subject with a thematic overview.

Chapter 1: Frege: Semantic value and reference

The opening chapter sets out Frege's logical language: its syntax and semantics, the notions of function and object, the treatment of predicates, connectives and quantifiers, and a semantic theory for a simple language. It supplies the formal vocabulary used in the rest of the book.

Chapter 2: Frege and Russell: Sense and definite descriptions

The chapter with the most sections (fourteen, counting the appendix). It introduces Frege's notion of sense, its objectivity, and four problems for it; Kripke's discussion of naming and necessity; Russell's account of names and descriptions, scope distinctions and attack on sense; Strawson and Donnellan on definite descriptions; and Kripke's causal-historical theory of reference. An appendix collects Frege's theses on sense and semantic value.

Chapter 3: Sense and verificationism: Logical positivism

From the Tractatus to the verification principle, its formulation and Foster's account of its nature. The chapter goes on to the a priori and the linguistic theory of necessity, Carnap on internal and external questions, logical positivism and ethical language, and moderate holism.

Chapter 4: Scepticism about sense (I): Quine on analyticity and translation

Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas" is given in two parts, each followed by criticism. The chapter then turns to the indeterminacy of translation, covering the "argument from below", the discussion of it by Evans and Hookway, and the "argument from above".

Chapter 5: Scepticism about sense (II): Kripke's Wittgenstein and the skeptical paradox

Kripke's sceptical paradox about meaning and its sceptical solution, with the argument against solitary language. Objections from Boghossian, Wright and Zalabardo follow, then the question whether meaning is normative and the "factualist" readings of Kripke's Wittgenstein.

Chapter 6: Saving sense: Responses to the sceptical paradox

A survey of replies to the paradox: sophisticated dispositionalism, Lewis-style reductionism, Fodor's "asymmetric dependency" account, McGinn on normativity and the ability conception of understanding, Wright's judgement-dependent conception, and Wittgenstein's own possible dissolution. The two new sections of the third edition, on Pettit's "ethocentric" account and Ginsborg's "partial reductionism", sit here.

Chapter 7: Sense, intention and speech acts: Grice's programme

Two approaches to meaning, then Grice on speaker's meaning and sentence meaning, Searle's modifications (illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions), objections to Gricean analyses, a response to Blackburn, and a return to Strawson on referring.

Chapter 8: Sense and Truth: Tarski and Davidson

Davidson's adequacy conditions for a theory of meaning, intensional versus extensional theories, Tarski's Convention T and Tarskian truth-theories, two problems about truth and translation, radical interpretation and the principle of charity, holism, and whether such theories can apply to natural language.

Chapter 9: Sense, world and metaphysics

The closing chapter links meaning to realism: non-cognitivism and the Frege-Geach problem, verification-transcendent truth and the arguments against it from acquisition, manifestation and rule-following, Twin-Earth, Wright on grades of objectivity, and two threats of quietism.

Key Concepts

Chapters 1–2: Frege, Russell and reference

• Semantic value: what an expression contributes to the truth conditions of sentences containing it.
• Sense: Frege's notion, introduced in the chapter and examined for its nature, its objectivity and four problems it faces.
• Definite descriptions and scope: Russell's analysis of phrases such as "the so-and-so", and the scope distinctions it requires.
• Causal-historical theory of reference: Kripke's alternative to description-based accounts of how names refer.

Chapters 3–4: Verification and scepticism about sense

• Verification principle: the positivist thesis linking meaning to what can be verified.
• Analytic-synthetic distinction: the contrast Quine attacks in "Two Dogmas".
• Indeterminacy of translation: Quine's thesis about translation, discussed through an "argument from below" and an "argument from above".

Chapters 5–6: Rule-following

• Sceptical paradox: Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein, on which no fact seems to fix what one means.
• Normativity of meaning: whether meaning something by a word carries obligations about its correct use.
• Dispositionalism and its rivals: attempts to find the fact in dispositions, asymmetric dependence, ability or judgement-dependence.

Chapters 7–9: Intention, truth and metaphysics

• Speaker's meaning versus sentence meaning: the distinction on which Grice's programme depends.
• Convention T and radical interpretation: Tarski's adequacy condition for truth-theories and Davidson's use of them in interpretation, with the principle of charity.
• Verification-transcendent truth: truth that outruns what can be verified, the centre of the realism debate in Chapter 9.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• A connected argument. The chapter titles ("Scepticism about sense", "Saving sense") show each stage motivated by the last, so a reader sees why Kripke's Wittgenstein follows Quine and why Davidson follows Grice. The publisher stresses this combination of historical development with a thematic overview.
• Debate built into the sections. Many sections are headed as criticism or reply: "Criticism of 'Two Dogmas'", "Boghossian's argument against the sceptical solution", "Objections to Gricean analyses". Readers meet the objections to each view alongside the view.
• Study support in the third edition. Chapter summaries, study questions and updated further-reading lists appear at the end of every chapter, and Chapter 1 sets out Frege's logical language and a semantic theory for a simple language before the later chapters rely on that vocabulary.
• A clear organising question. Anandi Hattiangadi, in a comment quoted by the publisher, praises the emphasis on the meta-semantic question "what constitutes meaning?".

Limitations

• Narrow in tradition and topic. The contents follow the analytic line from Frege to Davidson and the realism debate. The contents list has no chapter on context-sensitivity, on pragmatics beyond Grice and Searle, or on figurative language; Lycan's book names the last two among its topics.
• Weighted toward rule-following. Chapters 5 and 6, plus part of Chapter 9, concern one family of problems, and the third edition added more on it. A course with a different emphasis will need to skip or compress them.
• Formal material and length. Frege's logical language opens the book and Tarskian truth-theories occupy Chapter 8, and at 466 pages the book is more than a single short course can absorb. Its own Chapter 2 is divided into fourteen sections.

Where It Fits in the Course

Miller is the longest continuous argument in this course. Michael Morris's An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language builds each chapter around one or two classic texts, and Colin McGinn's Philosophy of Language: The Classics Explained takes ten much-anthologised papers one at a time; either is a gentler first encounter with the kind of arguments Miller reconstructs in detail. William Lycan's Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction is a more compact survey organised by topic (reference, theories of meaning, pragmatics, figurative language), and it covers areas that Miller leaves out, so the two work well as a pair.

The Martinich and Sosa anthology The Philosophy of Language collects the primary papers, so it is the natural companion for checking Miller's account against the originals. Donald Davidson's Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation collects essays on meaning, truth and interpretation, the subject of Chapter 8, and suits readers who have finished Miller and want the source.

How to Use This Book

The book is aimed at undergraduate and postgraduate students, according to the publisher. No particular prerequisite is stated; the opening chapter explains Frege's logical language itself, so a first logic course is helpful but the book does not ask readers to arrive with it.

A practical plan:

• Core: Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 7 through 9, read in order. Chapter 2 introduces sense, descriptions and causal-historical reference, the vocabulary the later chapters assume.
• Substantial but separable: Chapters 5 and 6 form a unit on rule-following. Read Chapter 5 for Kripke's paradox and the objections to his solution, and dip into Chapter 6 for the responses that interest you.
• Optional on a first pass: Chapter 3 on logical positivism (useful background for Chapters 4 and 9) and the appendix to Chapter 2.

Read the chapter summary after each chapter and answer the study questions before moving on. Because each chapter ends with a guide to further reading, use these to pick one original paper per chapter, such as Quine's "Two Dogmas" for Chapter 4, and read it with Miller's two-part treatment beside it.