Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

Citation

Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3rd ed.; J. W. Ellington, Trans.). Hackett Publishing. Free public-domain translation: T. K. Abbott, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Project Gutenberg eBook #5682, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682

Chapter Summary

The work is short: the Hackett edition runs to 92 pages and adds Ellington's new translation of Kant's essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns". Kant's text, first published in 1785, consists of a preface and three sections. The preface states the plan: to proceed analytically from common knowledge of morality to its supreme principle, and then synthetically back from that principle to the common knowledge in which it is used.

Preface

Kant divides philosophy into logic, physics and ethics, and separates the empirical part of ethics (practical anthropology) from its rational part, a metaphysic of morals. He argues that a moral law must carry absolute necessity, so that its ground cannot lie in human nature or circumstances, and that an action is morally good only if it is done for the sake of the law and not merely in conformity with it. He explains the title: he calls the book fundamental principles instead of a critical examination of pure practical reason, and limits it to establishing the supreme principle of morality, leaving a full critique and a system of duties for later.

First Section: Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical

The section opens with the claim that nothing is good without qualification except a good will, whatever talents, qualities of temperament or gifts of fortune accompany it. It then develops what a good will involves through the concept of duty and three propositions: an action has moral worth when it is done from duty and not from inclination; its worth lies in the maxim on which it is done, not in the end it achieves; and duty is the necessity of acting out of respect for the law. The section concludes that the will should be guided by whether its maxim can be willed as a universal law. It adds that the claims of inclination breed a natural dialectic in common reason, which is driven to seek philosophy's help to keep its moral principles from being corrupted.

Second Section: Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Morals

The longest of the three sections. Kant argues that the concept of duty cannot be drawn from experience, that rational beings alone act according to the conception of laws, that imperatives express the relation of objective laws to an imperfect will, and that they command either hypothetically, as means to an end, or categorically, without reference to any end. He gives the formula of universal law ("Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law"), its variant as a law of nature, and applies it to four examples: suicide, a false promise, neglect of one's talents, and refusing to help others. He then derives the formula of humanity, which requires treating humanity, in oneself and in others, always as an end and never as a means only, with the same four examples; and the formula of autonomy, the will as giving universal law, which leads to the idea of a kingdom of ends, the distinction between market value and dignity, and the contrast between autonomy and heteronomy as the source of all spurious moral principles.

Third Section: Transition from the Metaphysic of Morals to the Critique of the Pure Practical Reason

The final section asks how a categorical imperative is possible. Its subheadings are "The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the Will", "Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all Rational Beings", "Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality", "How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?", "Of the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy" and a "Concluding Remark". Kant argues that a free will and a will under moral laws are the same, worries that this reasoning may be circular, and answers by distinguishing the standpoint of the sensible world, where we are subject to laws of nature, from that of the intelligible world, where we regard ourselves as free. He ends by admitting that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible, but claims we can comprehend its incomprehensibility.

Key Concepts

Preface and First Section

• Good will: the only thing good without qualification, good in itself and not by its results.
• Duty and respect for the law: acting from duty, as distinct from merely conforming to it.
• Maxim: the subjective principle on which an agent acts.

Second Section

• Hypothetical and categorical imperatives: commands conditional on an end versus unconditional commands.
• Formulas of universal law, humanity and autonomy: three statements of the one supreme principle.
• Kingdom of ends; dignity: a systematic union of rational beings under common laws, and the unconditional worth of persons.
• Autonomy and heteronomy: self-legislation versus governance by something outside the will.

Third Section

• Freedom as the key to autonomy: a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.
• Two standpoints: the sensible and the intelligible world.
• Limits of practical philosophy: what we can and cannot explain about freedom.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• Compact and sequential. The argument moves in three clearly signposted steps, from ordinary moral thought to a supreme principle, to its formulations, and then to the question of its validity.
• Concrete examples. The four examples are used with both the universal-law and the humanity formulas, which allows the two to be compared directly.
• The central ideas in one place. Good will, duty, the categorical imperative, autonomy, the kingdom of ends and dignity are all set out within a short text.
• A usable edition. Ellington's translation is described by the publisher as an expanded edition including a second short text, and an instructor quoted by the publisher calls it highly readable, accurate and affordable for undergraduates.

Limitations

• Dense in the second and third sections. The derivation of the formulas and the argument about freedom move quickly, and the third section's reasoning is notoriously difficult.
• Foundations, not applications. Kant explicitly sets aside the full system of duties and the application of the principle; his examples are brief, and he sets some questions aside as belonging to ethics proper.
• Dependence on other works. The Third Section looks ahead to a critique of pure practical reason, which the book does not supply.
• Different translation. The public-domain translation consulted uses older vocabulary, such as "maxim" and "thou", and the title "Fundamental Principles"; a student using Ellington should expect small differences.

Where It Fits in the Course

Within the ethics course, Kant's Grounding is the primary text for deontological ethics, balanced by Mill's Utilitarianism in the Hackett edition edited by George Sher, the classic defence of the principle of utility. James and Stuart Rachels's The Elements of Moral Philosophy and Russ Shafer-Landau's The Fundamentals of Ethics are textbooks that introduce the major theories, including Kantian ethics, and test them against cases; either is a sensible first stop.

Bernard Williams's Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is a critical response to systematic theories of the Kantian and utilitarian kind and is best read after the Grounding and Mill.

How to Use This Book

The book is for first- and second-year philosophy students as a short primary text, though the second and third sections reward careful rereading.

A practical plan: read the preface lightly, then the First Section slowly, since it sets up good will and duty. Spend most of the time on the Second Section, tracing the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, the formula of universal law with its four examples, the formula of humanity and the formula of autonomy. Read the Third Section last, once the earlier arguments are clear, concentrating on the two standpoints and the closing remark about the limits of explanation. Pair the reading with a textbook chapter on Kantian ethics and with Mill, and write short summaries of each formula and example.

Edition and Sources

This guide is based on the full text of the public-domain translation by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), Project Gutenberg eBook #5682 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682): the preface, the headings and the key passages of all three sections, and the concluding remark were read. The site's edition is Ellington's translation (Hackett, third edition, 1993), which is under copyright; the publisher's page confirms its length and its added essay on the supposed right to lie.