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The Problems of Philosophy cover

Philosophy

Philosophy

The Problems of Philosophy

Bertrand Russell; introduction by John Skorupski

Russell's short classic, first published in 1912, introduces philosophy through the theory of knowledge. It asks what we can know of the external world, distinguishes appearance from reality, and examines matter, idealism, acquaintance and description, induction, a priori knowledge, and the value of philosophy. This Oxford World's Classics edition adds an introduction by John Skorupski and a guide to further reading.

Prerequisites: No prior philosophy is required, though readers should be ready for sustained abstract argument.

Difficulty Level
Beginner
Academic Level
Undergraduate
introduction to philosophyepistemologyappearance and realityinductionrussellclassic text

01 / Reading Guide

Reading Guide

Citation

Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Free official edition: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5827

Chapter Summary

Context and Argument

Russell wrote this short book in 1912 for a general readership. The two-paragraph preface says he kept to problems on which something "positive and constructive" could be said, so theory of knowledge takes up more room than metaphysics. He credits unpublished work by G. E. Moore on sense-data and by J. M. Keynes on probability and induction. The fifteen chapters form a single argument. They start from doubt about an ordinary table and work towards an account of what we can know by acquaintance, by description, by induction and a priori. They then turn to truth and error, set limits on metaphysics, and end with a defence of the value of philosophy.

Chapters I–IV: Appearance and Reality; The Existence of Matter; The Nature of Matter; Idealism

Chapter I examines a table whose colour, texture and shape change with the observer. It introduces "sense-data" as what is immediately known in sensation, and asks whether there is a real table and what it is like. Chapter II takes Descartes' method of doubt as a starting point but argues that what is certain is the experience itself, not a lasting self. It concludes that belief in an external world is an "instinctive belief" and a simpler hypothesis than a lifelong dream; the examples include a cat that gets hungry while unobserved. Chapter III argues that physical objects are in a public "physical space" whose relations correspond to those among sense-data, but whose intrinsic nature stays unknown. Chapter IV criticises Berkeley's idealism: it rests on confusing the act of apprehension, which is mental, with the thing apprehended. The chapter ends by separating knowledge of things from knowledge of truths.

Chapter V: Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description

We are acquainted with sense-data, with things remembered, with our own mental states through introspection, probably with the self, and with universals. Physical objects and other minds are known only by description, as "the so-and-so". Examples such as Bismarck and Julius Caesar show how proper names hide descriptions. The chapter ends with the principle that every proposition we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.

Chapters VI–VII: On Induction; On Our Knowledge of General Principles

Chapter VI asks why we expect the sun to rise tomorrow. Using the chicken whose neck is finally wrung, it separates the habit of expectation from its justification. It states a two-part principle of induction about probability, and argues that experience can neither prove nor disprove it. Chapter VII identifies other self-evident principles of inference, including the traditional "laws of thought". On the empiricist–rationalist dispute, Russell sides with the rationalists that some knowledge is a priori and with the empiricists that knowledge of existence always needs experience. He counts logic, pure mathematics and judgements of intrinsic value as a priori.

Chapters VIII–X: How A Priori Knowledge Is Possible; The World of Universals; On Our Knowledge of Universals

Chapter VIII presents Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements and Hume's challenge about causation. It objects that Kant's solution cannot secure certainty, since our own nature might change. It also argues that the law of contradiction concerns things, not merely thoughts. Chapter IX defends a modified version of Plato's theory of forms. Universals, especially relations such as "north of", are neither mental nor physical; they "subsist" in a timeless world of being. Chapter X explains how we become acquainted with sensible qualities, spatial and temporal relations and resemblance. It argues that all a priori knowledge concerns relations between universals, which removes the mystery of knowing general truths without surveying their instances.

Chapters XI–XIII: On Intuitive Knowledge; Truth and Falsehood; Knowledge, Error, and Probable Opinion

Chapter XI treats self-evident truths: principles of logic and arithmetic, judgements of perception and of memory. It argues that self-evidence comes in degrees. Chapter XII sets out three requirements for a theory of truth. It rejects coherence as the meaning of truth while keeping it as a test, and develops a correspondence theory in which belief is a relation uniting the mind with several objects, illustrated by Othello believing that Desdemona loves Cassio. Chapter XIII shows that true belief is not enough for knowledge. It distinguishes intuitive from derivative knowledge, allows "psychological inference" when a valid logical inference could be found, and grades beliefs from certainty to "probable opinion", with coherence raising the probability.

Chapters XIV–XV: The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge; The Value of Philosophy

Chapter XIV argues against Hegel's claim to prove a priori that reality is a single harmonious whole. It uses Cantor's work on infinity and non-Euclidean geometry to show that logic now opens up possibilities rather than ruling them out. Philosophy differs from science by being criticism, though not the blank doubt of the complete sceptic. Chapter XV finds the value of philosophy not in definite answers but in the questions themselves, which free the mind from "the tyranny of custom", and in the impartial contemplation that enlarges the self.

Key Concepts

Chapters I–IV

  • Sense-data: what is immediately known in sensation (colours, sounds, hardnesses), as distinct from the act of sensing and from the physical object.
  • Instinctive belief: a belief, such as belief in an external world, that we find in ourselves before reflection. It is rejected only if it clashes with other such beliefs.
  • Act and object: the distinction between the mental act of apprehending and the thing apprehended, which Russell uses against Berkeley.

Chapters V–VII

  • Acquaintance and description: direct awareness of a thing, versus knowing it as the unique thing answering a description.
  • Principle of induction: the more often A has been found with B, and never without it, the more probable it is that they will be found together next time, or always.
  • A priori knowledge: knowledge that experience prompts but cannot prove, such as logic and arithmetic. It never establishes existence by itself.

Chapters VIII–X

  • Analytic and synthetic: judgements whose predicate is contained in the subject, versus judgements that add something new; Kant held that arithmetic is synthetic a priori.
  • Universals: what many particulars can share, including qualities and relations; they subsist without existing in space or time.

Chapters XI–XV

  • Self-evidence: the immediate evidence of some truths, coming in degrees from certainty to faint presumption.
  • Correspondence theory of truth: a belief is true when its objects, in the order the belief gives them, form a corresponding fact.
  • Probable opinion: firmly or hesitantly held belief that is neither knowledge nor error; Russell holds that most ordinary knowledge belongs here.
  • Philosophy as criticism: the testing of the principles used in science and daily life, keeping those that survive.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

  • A single, cumulative argument. Each chapter ends by stating the question the next one will take up, so the book reads as one line of inquiry from the table in Chapter I to the account of knowledge and error in Chapter XIII.
  • Ordinary examples carrying real theory. The changing table, the hungry cat, the chicken and its owner, the Emperor of China, Othello's false belief and the horse's fading hoofbeats each make an abstract point memorable without technical apparatus.
  • Fair treatment of rival views. Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Plato and Hegel are each presented sympathetically before Russell says where he thinks they go wrong, and he states plainly when an argument is "less strong than we could wish".
  • A lasting statement of why philosophy matters. Chapter XV is self-contained and makes the case for philosophy through its questions rather than its results.

Limitations

  • One period's agenda. The book is a snapshot of Russell's 1912 views. Sense-data, acquaintance with universals and the multiple-relation theory of judgement were all later revised or abandoned, by Russell among others, and the book itself gives no sign of these debates.
  • Narrow coverage for a general introduction. As the preface admits, theory of knowledge dominates. Ethics appears only in passing (as a priori knowledge of intrinsic value), and political philosophy, philosophy of religion and free will are barely touched.
  • Dated science and examples. References to the aether, the "late Prime Minister" Campbell-Bannerman and the Emperor of China need footnoting for modern readers.
  • Demanding middle chapters. Chapters VIII–X on Kant and universals move faster than the opening chapters.

Where It Fits in the Course

Among the books for the introductory course, Russell is the classic primary text: one philosopher arguing for his own positions. Simon Blackburn's Think is a modern single-author introduction organised by problems such as knowledge, mind, free will, God and ethics, so it covers much that Russell leaves out. Reading the two together shows how the treatment of scepticism, induction and the external world has developed. The OpenStax Introduction to Philosophy is a broad open textbook that draws on many traditions and builds reading and writing skills; it suits students who want a structured survey around Russell's argument.

For history, Anthony Kenny's A New History of Western Philosophy supplies background on the figures Russell discusses. Thomas Nagel's The View from Nowhere is a sustained monograph on subjectivity and objectivity, best read after an introduction such as this one; Russell's closing picture of impartial contemplation makes a useful point of contrast.

How to Use This Book

The book assumes no previous philosophy, only patience with careful prose; it runs to about 43,000 words. Read Chapters I–V in order, since everything later depends on the vocabulary of sense-data, acquaintance and description. Chapters VI–VII on induction and general principles form the next core unit. Chapters VIII–X are the hardest and can be read alongside an introduction to Kant and Plato. Chapters XII–XIII on truth and knowledge reward close study, and Chapter XV can be read first, or on its own, by anyone wondering why to study philosophy at all.

For each chapter, write down the question it asks, Russell's answer, and the strongest objection you can raise. Follow the bibliographical note and read at least one of the primary texts Russell recommends, such as Descartes' Meditations, Berkeley's Three Dialogues or Hume's Enquiry, alongside the matching chapters. For citation in coursework, use a modern printed edition with page numbers, such as the Oxford edition listed on this page, and treat its editorial introduction as secondary reading.

Edition and Sources

This guide is based on the full text of The Problems of Philosophy in Project Gutenberg eBook #5827 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5827), which reproduces Russell's 1912 text with its preface and bibliographical note. The preface, all fifteen chapters and the bibliographical note were read in full. The Oxford edition with John Skorupski's introduction listed on this page was not consulted.