Political Liberalism

Citation

Rawls, J. (2005). Political Liberalism (Expanded ed.). Columbia University Press. (Columbia Classics in Philosophy; first published 1993.)

Chapter Summary

The book is organised as nine lectures in three parts, with an introduction and an introduction to the paperback edition before them. The expanded edition, about 576 pages, adds the essay "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," which the publisher says outlines Rawls's plans to revise the book, cut short by his death. The publisher presents the book as continuing and revising the ideas of justice as fairness from A Theory of Justice, while changing their philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way: that earlier book assumed a "well-ordered society" with broad agreement on the good life, whereas modern democracies contain irreconcilable yet reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. The question is how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens can exist given that permanent fact.

Introduction and Introduction to the Paperback Edition

Two prefatory pieces open the volume, ahead of Part I.

Part I, Lecture I: Fundamental Ideas

Sets out the ideas on which everything else depends: the two fundamental questions the book addresses, the idea of a political conception of justice, society as a fair system of cooperation, the original position, the political conception of the person, the well-ordered society, and the point that such a society is neither a community nor an association. A closing section treats the use of abstract conceptions.

Part I, Lecture II: The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation

Distinguishes the reasonable from the rational and introduces the burdens of judgement and reasonable comprehensive doctrines. It then discusses the publicity condition at three levels, contrasts rational autonomy, which is artificial rather than political, with full autonomy, which is political rather than ethical, and treats the basis of motivation and moral psychology in a way described as philosophical and not psychological.

Part I, Lecture III: Political Constructivism

Explains the idea of a constructivist conception, compares it with Kant's moral constructivism, and presents justice as fairness as a constructivist view with a role for conceptions of society and person. The lecture closes with three conceptions of objectivity, the question of when objective reasons exist politically speaking, and the scope of political constructivism.

Part II, Lecture IV: The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus

Asks how political liberalism is possible and approaches the question of stability. It describes three features of an overlapping consensus, argues that such a consensus is neither indifferent nor sceptical and that a political conception need not be comprehensive, and traces the steps to a constitutional consensus and then an overlapping consensus.

Part II, Lecture V: Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good

Shows how a political conception limits conceptions of the good. Topics include goodness as rationality, primary goods and interpersonal comparisons, permissible conceptions of the good and political virtues, whether justice as fairness is fair to conceptions of the good, the good of political society, and the completeness of justice as fairness.

Part II, Lecture VI: The Idea of Public Reason

Introduces public reason as the ideal of democratic citizenship: the forums of public right, the content of public reason, constitutional essentials, the Supreme Court as exemplar of public reason, apparent difficulties, and its limits.

Part III, Lecture VII: The Basic Structure as Subject

Explains why the basic structure of society is the first subject of justice and considers libertarianism's view of it, the importance of background justice, how the basic structure affects individuals, the initial agreement as hypothetical and non-historical, and Rawls's reply to Hegel's criticism.

Part III, Lecture VIII: The Basic Liberties and Their Priority

Treats the special status of the basic liberties and the arguments for their priority, via the two moral powers, and what a fully adequate scheme of liberties requires. Sections cover free political speech, the clear and present danger rule, the fair value of political liberties, and liberties connected with the second principle.

Part III, Lecture IX: Reply to Habermas

Takes up the criticisms of Habermas: two main differences between the views, overlapping consensus and justification, the liberties of the moderns against the will of the people, the roots of the liberties, and procedural versus substantive justice. A short conclusion follows.

Key Concepts

Lectures I–III: Fundamental ideas

• Political conception of justice: a conception framed for the basic structure and meant to be freestanding, not derived from any single comprehensive doctrine.
• Reasonable pluralism and burdens of judgement: the explanation of why conscientious citizens disagree on the deepest questions.
• Political constructivism: the view that the principles of justice are constructed from conceptions of society and person.

Lectures IV–VI: Three main ideas

• Overlapping consensus: agreement on a political conception from within different reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
• Priority of the right: the limits a political conception of justice sets on permissible conceptions of the good.
• Public reason: the reasons citizens may offer one another in political argument about constitutional essentials.

Lectures VII–IX: Institutions

• Basic structure: the main political and social institutions, the first subject of justice.
• Basic liberties and fair value: the priority of the liberties and the aim of keeping political liberties fairly valuable.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• A clear architecture. Three parts of three lectures move from fundamental ideas to the three main ideas to institutions, and the detailed contents let a reader locate each topic.
• A statement of the problem. The publisher's framing, and the structure of Lectures I and II, make the shift from the earlier book clear: stability under reasonable pluralism, not only the content of principles.
• Engagement with critics. Lecture IX replies to Habermas, and Lecture VII answers Hegel's criticism, so the book tests its own position.
• The expanded edition. The additional essay on public reason shows how Rawls expected the book to be revised.

Limitations

• Built on an earlier book. The book assumes the main ideas of A Theory of Justice, such as the original position and the principles of justice, and does not restate them; the table of contents shows no lecture on the principle governing distribution, which readers must take from the earlier work.
• Constitutional examples. Lectures VI and VIII turn to the Supreme Court and the clear and present danger rule, so some discussion is tied to the United States.
• Abstract and layered. Lecture III's treatment of constructivism and objectivity is philosophically demanding, and later lectures depend on it.
• An unfinished revision. The public reason essay marks plans that Rawls's death cut short.

Where It Fits in the Course

In the political philosophy list this is a major advanced work in liberal political theory. Wolff's An Introduction to Political Philosophy and Miller's Political Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction organise the field around central questions, and Sandel's Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? presents rival theories of justice through concrete cases; each is a better first stop. Pettit's Republicanism is the main contrast in the list: it offers a republican alternative to liberal theory, which is a useful counterweight to Rawls.

The list's other full-length argument, Zoopolis, takes up the political status of animals and is a separate path, not a prerequisite or a sequel.

How to Use This Book

The book is for graduate students and advanced undergraduates who know the main ideas of A Theory of Justice and have taken at least one course in political philosophy.

A practical reading plan:

• Core: Lectures I, II, IV and VI, which give the fundamental ideas, reasonable pluralism, overlapping consensus and public reason, followed by the essay "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited."
• Supporting: Lecture V on the good and the priority of the right, and Lecture VII on the basic structure.
• Advanced: Lecture III on political constructivism, Lecture VIII on the basic liberties and Lecture IX on the exchange with Habermas.

Read the Introduction to the Paperback Edition first for an overview of the book's aims. Write a one-paragraph answer, in your own words, to the two fundamental questions posed in Lecture I, and use it to check your reading of the later lectures.