Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction

Citation

Rosenberg, A., & McIntyre, L. (2020). Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction (4th ed.). Routledge.

Chapter Summary

The fourth edition has fifteen chapters and runs to 308 pages according to Routledge (Google Books lists 294 pages and dates it 2019; Routledge's own page and the Library of Congress classification give 2020). It belongs to the Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy series. The publisher describes it as a thematically organised introduction that was thoroughly rewritten for this edition after instructor and student surveys, with chapter-end study questions and annotated suggested readings. The summaries below follow the chapter titles and the publisher's description; the contents list gives no sections within chapters.

Chapters 1–2: The Relationship Between Philosophy and Science; Why Is Philosophy of Science Important?

The book opens by placing philosophy of science in relation to science itself and then asks why the subject matters. These two chapters frame the subject before the thematic chapters begin.

Chapters 3–6: Scientific Explanation; Why Do Laws Explain?; Causation, Inexact Laws and Statistical Probabilities; Laws and Explanations in Biology and the "Special Sciences"

The first block is on explanation. It starts with scientific explanation in general, asks why laws explain, and then turns to causation, laws that hold only approximately, and statistical probabilities. The last chapter of the block is on laws and explanations in biology and the "special sciences", that is, the sciences other than fundamental physics.

Chapters 7–9: The Structure of Scientific Theories; Epistemic and Metaphysical Issues about Theories; Theory Construction vs. Model Building

The second block turns from explanation to theories. Chapter 7 is on the structure of scientific theories, Chapter 8 on epistemic and metaphysical questions about them (the realism and anti-realism debate on which the publisher says the text is updated), and Chapter 9 on the contrast between building theories and building models.

Chapters 10–11: Induction and Probability; Confirmation, Falsification, Underdetermination

The third block is about evidence. Chapter 10 treats induction and probability, and Chapter 11 confirmation, falsification and underdetermination; the publisher notes that the underdetermination text has been updated.

Chapters 12–15: Challenges from the History of Science; Naturalism in the Philosophy of Science; The Contested Character of Science; Science, Relativism and Objectivity

The titles of the final block point to a more critical stance towards science itself. It starts with challenges from the history of science, then takes up naturalism, the "contested character" of science, and the relation between science, relativism and objectivity.

Key Concepts

Chapters 1–6

• Scientific explanation: what it is for science to explain a phenomenon (Chapter 3).
• Laws and their explanatory role: why laws are thought to explain (Chapter 4).
• Causation and probability: causal claims, laws with exceptions and statistical probabilities (Chapter 5).
• The special sciences: explanation and laws in biology and the other sciences that are not fundamental physics (Chapter 6).

Chapters 7–11

• Scientific theories: their structure and the philosophical questions raised by what they say (Chapters 7–8).
• Models: the difference between constructing a theory and building a model (Chapter 9).
• Induction and confirmation: how evidence supports a hypothesis, and where falsification enters (Chapters 10–11).
• Underdetermination: the problem that evidence may not decide between rival theories (Chapter 11).

Chapters 12–15

• Challenges from the history of science: how episodes in the history of science bear on philosophical accounts of method (Chapter 12).
• Naturalism: the view that philosophy of science should be continuous with science itself (Chapter 13).
• Relativism and objectivity: whether scientific knowledge is objective (Chapter 15).

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• Systematic, thematic structure. The chapters run from explanation and laws, through theories, to evidence, and then to the history of science and the question of relativism, so each block builds on the one before. The publisher stresses "improved continuity between chapters" in this edition.
• Responsive revision. The text was rewritten after student and instructor surveys, with the aim of improving readability and accessibility "without sacrificing depth". Updated sections on underdetermination, social science and the realism/anti-realism debate are listed.
• Study materials. Each chapter ends with study questions and annotated suggested readings, and the publisher's page links to a list of relevant online primary sources.
• Reception. The publisher quotes W. Russ Payne in Teaching Philosophy, writing of an earlier edition, who calls the book comprehensive and sophisticated yet clear enough for students, and recommends it for courses with academically well prepared and motivated students. This is a publisher-selected excerpt.

Limitations

• Demanding for beginners. Payne's recommendation is for well-prepared and motivated students, and the book is a full-length survey of fifteen chapters, so it is a heavier first book than the short introductions in this course.
• Explanation comes before method and history. Readers who want to meet the classic debates about scientific method (induction, falsification, theory change) first must go to Chapter 10 onwards.
• Social science has no chapter of its own by title. The contents list shows one chapter on biology and the special sciences and none named for social science, although the publisher says the text on social science was updated.

Where It Fits in the Course

Rosenberg and McIntyre is the course's comprehensive textbook, arranged by topic. Samir Okasha's Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction and Peter Godfrey-Smith's Theory and Reality are easier first books: Okasha is short and uses examples from physics and biology, and Godfrey-Smith follows a century of debate from logical empiricism through Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend to Bayesianism and scientific realism. Alan Chalmers's What Is This Thing Called Science? is a compact introduction that moves from observation, experiment and induction to the major twentieth-century accounts of method. Rosenberg and McIntyre overlap with these on induction, falsification and the history of science (Chapters 10–12), but they give explanation, laws and causation a block of four chapters (3–6), where Chalmers gives laws a single chapter.

Two classics follow naturally. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is the classic work on how the history of science challenges accounts of method, the theme of Chapter 12, and Bas van Fraassen's The Scientific Image is a statement of constructive empiricism that bears on the realism and anti-realism debate to which the publisher says the text gives updated attention. Both assume the background that this textbook supplies.

How to Use This Book

The book suits second-year undergraduates and above who have had some introductory philosophy, and also students from the sciences who want a more systematic account than a short introduction offers. The publisher mentions no mathematical prerequisite, and the chapter titles show no formal apparatus beyond probability and confirmation.

For a one-semester course, read Chapters 1–2 for orientation, Chapters 3–6 for explanation and laws, Chapters 7–9 for theories and models, and Chapters 10–11 for evidence. Chapters 12–15 are the natural endpoint, since they put the earlier accounts under pressure. Students concentrating on method could read 10–12 first and return to 3–9 later.

Use the chapter-end study questions as self-tests, and the annotated suggested readings to move to primary sources; the online primary sources linked from the Routledge page are a ready supplement. Anyone new to the field might read Okasha or Godfrey-Smith first and then use this book for the topics those books treat briefly.