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Naming and Necessity cover

Philosophy

Philosophy

Naming and Necessity

Saul A. Kripke

The book version of three lectures Kripke gave at Princeton in 1970, with a later preface. It attacks the view that proper names are disguised descriptions, introduces rigid designation, and argues that some necessary truths are known only a posteriori, reshaping both philosophy of language and metaphysics.

Prerequisites: Readers should have taken an introductory logic course and know the basics of Frege and Russell on names and descriptions.

Difficulty Level
Advanced
Academic Level
Undergraduate
metaphysicsphilosophy of languageproper namesrigid designationnecessity

01 / Reading Guide

Reading Guide

Citation

Kripke, S. A. (1991). Naming and Necessity. Wiley-Blackwell. (Book edition first published 1980; lectures delivered 1970.)

Chapter Summary

The book is the text of three lectures given by Kripke at Princeton University in January 1970. They first appeared in 1972 in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, and were published as a book in 1980 with a preface by the author. In the 1980 pagination the preface runs about twenty pages, the three lectures about 135 pages and a short set of addenda about nine, before the index. The publisher describes the book as redirecting philosophical attention to questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to their connection with theories of naming and identity.

Preface

Written for the book edition, the preface precedes the lectures. Because it looks back on them, it is easier to follow after Lecture III.

Lecture I (January 20, 1970)

Explains and criticises the existing accounts of how names work. The target is the descriptivist theory associated with Frege and Russell, on which a name is tied to a description or a cluster of descriptions that its bearer uniquely satisfies. Kripke notes that earlier criticisms by Wittgenstein, Searle and Strawson did not, in his view, identify the real flaws. He sets out a semi-formal version of the theory, with a list of theses and a condition that the account must not be circular, to be used as the object of attack.

Lecture II (January 22, 1970)

Reconsiders the cluster theory and argues for Kripke's own position on reference, which contributed to the development of the causal theory of reference, on which a name refers through a causal connection to its bearer, passed on within communities of speakers. The arguments against the cluster theory include the circularity of its theses and counterexamples: Aristotle might not have done the things attributed to him and would still be Aristotle, and in a story in which Gödel's incompleteness theorems turn out to have been proved by a man named Schmidt, "Gödel" still refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt.

Lecture III (January 29, 1970)

Develops the necessity of identity and draws consequences for natural kinds, the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical necessity, essential properties and the mind-body problem. Kripke recaps two lines of criticism of descriptivism and argues that identity is a relation of an object to itself, so a true identity between two names is necessarily true even if it can be known only a posteriori. This is the basis of his claim that not every necessary truth is a priori. He turns it against the identity theory of mind: such an identity would have to be necessary, he argues, yet pain could occur without the physical state with which it is identified.

Addenda

A short set of addenda follows the third lecture, before the index.

Key Concepts

Preface and Lecture I: The target

  • Descriptivism: the view that a name's reference is fixed by a description or cluster of descriptions that its bearer satisfies.
  • Noncircularity condition: the requirement that the properties used to fix reference must not themselves involve reference in an ineliminable way.

Lecture II: A new picture of reference

  • Causal theory of reference: a name refers to an object through a chain of causal links between speakers, not through descriptions.
  • Rigid designator: a term that refers to the same object in every possible world in which the object exists; proper names are rigid, most descriptions are not.

Lecture III: Necessity and identity

  • Necessity of identity: if two names refer to the same object, the identity is necessarily true.
  • A posteriori necessity: a truth that is necessary but can be known only empirically, such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus."
  • Natural kind terms and essence: terms such as "water" and the idea that objects have essential properties.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

  • A single sustained argument. Three lectures present a connected case, from a critique of descriptivism through a rival picture of reference to consequences for necessity, kinds and the mind.
  • Memorable examples. Aristotle, Gödel and Schmidt, Nixon and Hesperus and Phosphorus give concrete cases for each point, which makes the book unusually easy to follow in outline.
  • Compact. The lectures take about 135 pages, so the whole book can be read in a few sittings and reread.
  • Wide influence. Scott Soames has ranked it among the most important works in the philosophy of language, and a large later literature on reference, essentialism and mind starts from its arguments.

Limitations

  • A lecture transcript. The 1980 edition is a lightly edited transcript, so the argument is informal and its theses are less carefully stated than in a treatise.
  • Prior knowledge assumed. The criticisms are aimed at specific views associated with Frege, Russell and Searle, so a reader without that background will miss some of the point.
  • An outline rather than a finished theory. Kripke outlines a causal theory of reference and does not state a complete one, so its details have to be taken from later work.
  • Breadth in a short space. The lectures move from names to identity, natural kinds and mind quickly, so each topic is treated briefly.

Where It Fits in the Course

In the metaphysics list, Kripke sits at the advanced end. Loux and Crisp's Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction is the standard survey of the central problems; van Inwagen's Metaphysics argues for definite positions on large questions without presupposing philosophy; Mumford's Metaphysics: A Very Short Introduction and Conee and Sider's Riddles of Existence are readable starting points, the latter including necessity among its topics. These help with the vocabulary of modality that Kripke uses.

Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds is the closest companion, since it is a later book-length defence of a very different account of possibility and necessity. Read after Kripke, it shows how the debate about modality continued.

How to Use This Book

The book suits advanced undergraduates and graduate students who have taken a logic course and know the basics of Frege and Russell on names and descriptions.

A practical reading plan:

  • First pass: the three lectures in order, taking Lecture I as the statement of the target and the examples in Lectures II and III as the main evidence.
  • Preface and addenda: read the preface after the lectures and consult the addenda for further comments.
  • Notes to keep: for each lecture, write down the main claims in one sentence, and list the examples with the point each is meant to make.

Pair Lecture I with a short account of Frege's and Russell's views, work out for yourself why the necessity of identity does not conflict with the possibility of empirical discovery, and compare the argument against the identity theory of mind with a standard account of that theory.