Index / 001 EN
Second Treatise of Government cover

Political Science

Political Science

Second Treatise of Government

John Locke

Locke's foundational work in liberal political theory that establishes the concepts of natural rights, government by consent, and the right of revolution, fundamentally influencing democratic thought and constitutional government.

Difficulty Level
Intermediate
Academic Level
Undergraduate
liberal theorynatural rightssocial contractgovernment by consentconstitutional government

01 / Reading Guide

Reading Guide

Citation

Locke, J. (1690). Second Treatise of Government (in Two Treatises of Government). Free official edition: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370

Chapter Summary

Context and Argument

The Second Treatise is the second half of Locke's Two Treatises of Government, published in 1690. The first half is a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer's claim that kings inherit the absolute authority God gave to Adam. The Preface to the whole work says that the part which survives is meant to establish King William's title in "the consent of the people" and to justify the people of England. The Second Treatise is a short, numbered text of nineteen chapters and 243 sections, with the full title "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government".

Its argument runs in a clear sequence. Political power must be understood by asking what condition people are in naturally, that is, free and equal under a law of nature. People leave this condition by their own consent, to protect their lives, liberties and estates, which Locke calls their "property". Government is a trust for those ends, so a government that destroys them loses its claim to obedience and the people may act to replace it.

Chapter I: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government

A one-section summary of the First Treatise: Adam had no natural or divinely given authority over his children or the world, and even if he had, his heirs would not. Locke then defines political power as a right to make laws with the penalty of death, and all lesser penalties, for regulating and preserving property and for using the force of the community in executing those laws, all only for the public good.

Chapters II–IV: State of Nature, State of War, Slavery

Chapter II describes the state of nature as one of perfect freedom and equality within the law of nature, which binds everyone and which reason teaches. Everyone has the right to punish violations of it. Chapter III defines the state of war as a settled design against another's life and explains why it is hard to end without a common judge. Chapter IV distinguishes natural liberty from liberty in society, and rejects slavery except as the continuation of a state of war.

Chapter V: Of Property

Locke starts from the earth as given to humankind in common and argues that a person owns his own body and so the labour of his hands. By mixing labour with something taken from the common stock, one makes it one's own, within limits: enough and as good must be left for others, and nothing may be allowed to spoil. The chapter then shows how money, which does not decay, allowed larger possessions by consent and led to land being enclosed.

Chapters VI–VII: Paternal Power, Political or Civil Society

Chapter VI separates parental authority, shared by both parents and ending when the child can reason, from political power. Chapter VII describes political society as arising when people give up their individual executive power of the law of nature to a common authority, in contrast with absolute monarchy, which Locke says is no form of civil government at all.

Chapters VIII–IX: Beginning of Political Societies, Ends of Political Society and Government

Chapter VIII argues that no one can be subjected to another's political power without consent. A majority acts for the whole body once it is formed, and consent may be express or tacit, as in the case of someone who enjoys land under a government. Chapter IX asks why a free person would give up natural freedom and answers that the state of nature lacks established law, a known judge and power to enforce; government provides all three.

Chapters X–XII: Forms, Extent of Legislative Power, Distinct Powers

Chapter X lists the forms of commonwealth by who holds the legislative power. Chapter XI says the legislative is supreme but limited: it must rule by standing laws, serve the public good, not take property without consent and not transfer its authority. Chapter XII distinguishes the legislative, the executive, and the "federative" power over war, peace and foreign relations.

Chapters XIII–XV: Subordination, Prerogative, Powers Considered Together

Chapter XIII says the legislative is only a fiduciary power, so the people keep a supreme power to remove or alter it. Chapter XIV discusses prerogative as the executive's discretion to act for the public good where the law is silent. Chapter XV compares paternal, political and despotical power so as to show how confusing them produces errors.

Chapters XVI–XIX: Conquest, Usurpation, Tyranny, Dissolution of Government

Chapter XVI argues that conquest does not give a right to rule the conquered, beyond compensation for the cost of an unjust war. Chapter XVII defines usurpation, and Chapter XVIII defines tyranny as power exercised beyond right for the ruler's own advantage, to which force may be opposed. Chapter XIX separates the dissolution of society from that of government, lists the ways a government is dissolved, including by the prince or legislature acting against its trust, and answers the question who is to judge by saying that the people are, with an "appeal to heaven" as the last resort.

Key Concepts

Chapters II–V

  • Law of nature: a rule of reason binding everyone, according to which no one should harm another in life, health, liberty or possessions.
  • State of nature and state of war: the condition without a common authority, and the hostile condition into which it can fall.
  • Labour and property: ownership arising from mixing one's labour with common resources, subject to non-waste and sufficiency.

Chapters VI–XII

  • Consent and compact: the only way to leave the state of nature and become subject to political power.
  • Majority rule: the community acts as the greater part decides.
  • Separation of functions: the legislative, executive and federative powers.

Chapters XIII–XIX

  • Trust: government as a fiduciary power held for the public good.
  • Prerogative: discretion to act without or against the law for the public good.
  • Tyranny and dissolution of government: power beyond right and the circumstances under which the people may resist.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

  • A clear chain of argument. The text builds from natural condition to consent, government and resistance in a steady sequence that can be summarised in a paragraph.
  • A concrete theory of limits. Chapters XI and XIII give specific limits on the legislature, so the idea of limited government is not left abstract.
  • A foundational account of property. Chapter V is the part most often assigned separately, and it connects labour, enclosure and money to consent.

Limitations

  • Unfinished context. The Preface says the full discourse is incomplete, and the Second Treatise answers Filmer without presenting that argument, so readers lacking the First Treatise miss part of the point.
  • Tensions in the account of consent. Tacit consent in Chapter VIII is defined broadly, which makes it difficult to say when consent has actually been given.
  • Terminology. Terms such as "property" and "state of war" have specialised senses and need to be tracked carefully.

Where It Fits in the Course

In this course the Second Treatise is the natural partner to Hobbes's Leviathan: both begin with a state of nature and consent but reach different conclusions about authority and resistance. Locke's separation of the state of nature from the state of war (Chapters II and III) is the distinction to watch when comparing the two. Rousseau's The Social Contract continues the tradition, while Mill's On Liberty explicitly rejects a contract basis for society. Tocqueville's Democracy in America shows these ideas operating in a real republic.

Marx and Engels's The Communist Manifesto attacks the property regime Locke defends and is a useful counterpart to Chapter V. Machiavelli's The Prince and Aristotle's Politics give contrasts with Locke's starting points.

How to Use This Book

The text is short and readable, but its numbered sections reward slow reading. Read Chapters II, III, V, VII–IX and XI–XIII, and XVIII–XIX as the core. Chapters VI, X, XIV–XVII are valuable for completeness but can be skimmed first.

When reading, track the claims in each chapter against one question: what makes political power legitimate? Compare Chapter II with Hobbes's account of the natural condition and Chapter XIX with Hobbes on the sovereign. Cite by section number, since it works across editions. A modern annotated edition, such as the Cambridge edition listed on this page, which includes both Treatises, is better for coursework.

Edition and Sources

This guide is based on Project Gutenberg eBook #7370 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370), which reproduces the 1690 text of the Second Treatise without modern editorial material. The Preface, the chapter titles and the opening sections of all nineteen chapters were read, together with Sections 27, 87, 149, 168 and 240–243 and the passages on tacit consent, spoilage and money.