Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries

Citation

Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.

Chapter Summary

The second edition runs to 368 pages: seventeen numbered chapters, prefaces to both editions, an appendix of variable values, references and an index. Its data cover 1945 to 2010; the first edition appeared in 1999.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Opens the book and frames its subject: the institutions of democracies and, in the publisher's words, the question of what type of democracy works best.

Chapters 2–3: The Westminster Model of Democracy; The Consensus Model of Democracy

The two ideal types that organise everything else. The Westminster, or majoritarian, model concentrates power; the consensus model spreads it. The chapters set out the contrast in the abstract before any country is measured.

Chapter 4: Thirty-Six Democracies

Introduces the cases to which the models are applied: the thirty-six democracies of the title, observed over the post-1945 period.

Chapters 5–9: Party Systems; Cabinets; Executive-Legislative Relations; Electoral Systems; Interest Groups

Each chapter takes one institutional contrast and applies it to the thirty-six countries: two-party versus multiparty patterns, concentration versus sharing of executive power, dominance versus balance between executive and legislature, majority and plurality methods versus proportional representation, and pluralism versus corporatism in interest groups.

Chapters 10–13: Division of Power; Parliaments and Congresses; Constitutions; Central Banks

The second cluster of contrasts: federal versus unitary and centralized versus decentralized government, concentration versus division of legislative power, amendment procedures and judicial review, and independent versus dependent central banks.

Chapter 14: The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy

Brings the measures together. The appendix on dimensions and ten basic variables shows that the book reduces its institutional indicators to two dimensions, and this chapter presents the resulting map of the thirty-six countries.

Chapters 15–16: Effective Government and Policy-Making; The Quality of Democracy and a "Kinder, Gentler" Democracy

The performance chapters. The first asks whether consensus democracy makes a difference to effective government and policy-making; the second asks the same of the quality of democracy and of what the title calls a kinder, gentler democracy.

Chapter 17: Conclusions and Recommendations

Draws the argument together and turns to recommendations. The book ends with an appendix of variable values for 1945–2010 and 1981–2010, then references and an index.

Key Concepts

Chapters 1–4: Models and cases

• Westminster (majoritarian) model: democracy in which power is concentrated in the hands of the majority.
• Consensus model: democracy that shares, disperses and limits power.
• Thirty-six democracies: the set of countries compared across the post-1945 period.

Chapters 5–13: Institutional contrasts

• Executive power sharing: the degree to which cabinets concentrate or share power, treated alongside party systems and executive-legislative relations.
• Proportional representation versus majority and plurality methods: the electoral-system contrast of Chapter 8.
• Pluralism versus corporatism: the two patterns of interest-group organisation.
• Federal-unitary and centralized-decentralized contrasts: the division of power between levels of government.
• Judicial review and central-bank independence: constitutional and monetary institutions treated as measurable features of the model.

Chapters 14–17: Map and performance

• Two-dimensional conceptual map: the arrangement of countries along two dimensions, built from ten basic variables.
• Effective government: the performance claim tested in Chapter 15.
• Quality of democracy: the claim tested in Chapter 16.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• A single argument carried through the whole structure. The book moves from two models, to the cases, to nine institutional contrasts, to a combined map, to performance. A reader who follows the chapter order sees how each measure is built and then used.
• Titles that state the contrast. Chapters 5 to 13 name the pair of options on each institutional dimension, which makes the book usable as a reference: the chapter on electoral systems or on central banks can be read on its own.
• Data that extend to 2010. The second edition's data run to 2010, and the appendix reports variable values for both 1945–2010 and 1981–2010, so students can compare the long run with the later period.
• An explicit test of why institutions matter. The last chapters do not stop at classification. They ask whether the consensus pattern is linked with effective government and with a better quality of democracy.
• Reception. For the previous edition, the publisher quotes Robert Dahl on Lijphart's command of the literature and his unmatched data, and a Choice review that expected the book to remain a standard in graduate and undergraduate comparative politics courses.

Limitations

• Fixed case set. The conclusions concern thirty-six democracies. Readers interested in newer, smaller or less stable democracies need further sources to judge how far the patterns extend.
• Ends in 2010. The latest data are from 2010, so developments in party systems, constitutions and electoral rules since then are not covered.
• The performance claims are the part to test. Chapters 15 and 16 argue for a link between consensus institutions and better outcomes. The chapter titles pose these as questions of whether consensus democracy makes a difference; students should compare them with later critiques and with their own cases.
• Demanding for a first course. The book compares institutions across many countries with quantitative indicators, so it is most useful to readers who already know the main institutions of democratic government from an introductory text.

Where It Fits in the Course

Patterns of Democracy is a monograph that sits above the course's introductory textbooks. Comparative Government and Politics and Essentials of Comparative Politics teach comparative politics through themes and core concepts, and the edited Comparative Politics gives a wider international survey; any of these supplies the vocabulary of parties, electoral systems and constitutions that Lijphart takes for granted. Principles of Comparative Politics is a textbook built around explicit theory and evidence, and its treatment of electoral and institutional choice can be read in parallel with Chapters 5–13.

Veto Players by George Tsebelis offers a different kind of general theory of institutions. Tsebelis builds a spatial model around actors whose agreement is needed to change policy, while Lijphart classifies and measures patterns of institutions and then tests their effects. Reading the two together shows two ways of comparing regimes: by pattern and by mechanism.

How to Use This Book

The book suits upper-year undergraduates and graduate students who have already completed an introductory comparative politics course, and researchers who want a reference point for institutional design. Comfort with reading tables of indicators will help.

A practical plan:

• Core: Chapters 1–3 for the two models, Chapter 14 for the map, and the summary sections of Chapters 15–17 for the performance argument.
• By topic: read Chapters 5–13 selectively, matching them to the institutions the course is studying, for instance Chapter 8 with a unit on electoral systems or Chapter 13 with a unit on central banks.
• Reference: the appendix of variable values is useful when checking where a particular country falls.
• Active reading: for each institutional chapter, place a country you know on the contrast, then check where the book puts it. Read Chapters 15 and 16 last and compare their claims with later research.