An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

Citation

Lemos, N. (2020). An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Chapter Summary

The second edition has twelve chapters, a preface to the second edition, a select bibliography and an index, in roughly 290 pages. It belongs to the Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy series. The first edition (2007) had ten chapters, one of them titled "Internalism, externalism, and epistemic circularity"; in the second edition that material fills two chapters, and the publisher describes the revision as adding three new chapters, on internalism and externalism, epistemic circularity, and testimony and disagreement. Each chapter takes one theory or one problem and works through it, usually in conversation with a small number of named authors.

Chapter 1: Knowledge, Truth, and Justification

Introduces the concepts at the centre of the traditional picture of knowledge: truth, belief and justification. The chapter's keywords include defeasible justification and defeaters, and the correspondence, pragmatist and coherence accounts of truth.

Chapter 2: The Traditional Analysis and the Gettier Problem

Presents the Gettier problem and the main proposed solutions, including the causal, defeasibility and no-false-grounds analyses. It closes with Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology and the view that knowledge cannot be analysed at all.

Chapter 3: Foundationalism

Starts from the regress argument for foundationalism and then compares classical and modest foundationalism with Phenomenal Conservatism, the view that appearances ("seemings") can justify belief. Basic belief and basic justification are the organising ideas.

Chapter 4: The Coherence Theory of Justification

Sets out versions of coherentism with arguments for and against, including the isolation objection and the dilemma of nondoxastic justification. BonJour is the chief figure discussed.

Chapter 5: Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology

Examines reliabilist theories of justification, associated with Goldman, and Sosa's virtue epistemology. Two problems for reliabilism, the new evil demon problem and the problem of unknown reliability, are considered, together with Sosa's distinction between accurate, adroit and apt belief.

Chapter 6: Internalism and Externalism about Justification

New in this edition. Distinguishes two forms of internalism, mentalist and access internalism, and considers three kinds of argument in favour of internalism, among them arguments from responsible belief and from the subject's perspective.

Chapter 7: Epistemic Circularity

New in this edition. Asks whether a source of belief can be used to support the claim that the source is reliable. It examines the views of Alston and Sosa, the track-record argument, bootstrapping and Vogel's discussion.

Chapter 8: Skepticism

Sets out main arguments for skepticism, with the argument from ignorance treated in detail. The replies discussed are the relevant alternatives reply, the contextualist reply, the Moorean reply and the inference-to-the-best-explanation reply.

Chapter 9: The Problem of the Criterion

Explores Chisholm's formulation of the problem and his defence of common-sense particularism, then various criticisms of that approach. Particularism and methodism are the two opposed responses, with Moser, Alston and BonJour among the critics.

Chapter 10: The A Priori

Examines views about a priori justification: whether it must be indefeasible, whether it is confined to analytic propositions, and what it is for a proposition to be analytic. The synthetic a priori is among the topics.

Chapter 11: Naturalized Epistemology

Explores epistemic naturalism through the replacement thesis, the continuity thesis and the Darwinian argument, with the views of Quine, Kornblith, Maffie and Goldman.

Chapter 12: Testimony and Disagreement

New in this edition. Two topics from social epistemology: what testimony needs in order to be a source of justification or knowledge, and whether it can be a basic source (reductionism and nonreductionism), and three views about how to respond to disagreement with epistemic peers, the Equal Weight View, the Steadfast View and the Total Evidence View.

Key Concepts

Chapters 1–2: Knowledge and the Gettier Problem

• Defeater: a further consideration that removes justification a belief would otherwise have, which is why justification in Chapter 1 is called defeasible.
• Gettier problem: the difficulty that justified true belief seems insufficient for knowledge; the causal, defeasibility and no-false-grounds analyses are attempts at a fix.
• Knowledge first: the view, associated with Williamson, that knowledge is unanalysable and can be used to explain other epistemic notions.

Chapters 3–7: Theories of Justification

• Basic justification: justification that does not depend on other justified beliefs, the endpoint of the regress argument for foundationalism.
• Phenomenal Conservatism: the view that how things seem can by itself give some justification.
• Isolation objection: the complaint that a coherent system of beliefs might be cut off from the world.
• Apt belief: in Sosa's terms, belief that is accurate because it is adroit, that is, because of the believer's competence.
• Mentalist and access internalism: two ways of saying that what justifies a belief must be internal to the subject.
• Bootstrapping: using a source to vouch for its own reliability, the worry at the centre of epistemic circularity.

Chapters 8–12: Scepticism, Method and New Directions

• Relevant alternatives: a reply to scepticism that restricts which possibilities must be ruled out for knowledge.
• Problem of the criterion: the difficulty of saying how to identify what is known without first knowing how to identify it.
• Synthetic a priori: justification independent of experience for propositions that are not merely true by meaning.
• Replacement thesis: the claim, associated with Quine, that epistemology should be replaced by empirical psychology.
• Equal Weight View: the view that peers who disagree should give each other's opinion equal weight.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

• A problem-by-problem structure. The chapter list and the publisher's chapter abstracts show a consistent design: one theory or problem per chapter, followed by the arguments for and against it. A student can read a single chapter without having read all its neighbours.
• Written for a first course. The publisher describes the book as intended primarily for students taking their first classes in epistemology, and describes the exposition as clear and systematic. The first chapter starts from the traditional concepts of truth, belief and justification before any theory is introduced.
• Current coverage. The second edition adds social epistemology (testimony and disagreement), a separate chapter on internalism and externalism, and a chapter on epistemic circularity, so the book reaches material that earlier versions of the contents did not.
• Contact with the literature. The chapter abstracts name the authors whose positions are discussed (Goldman, Sosa, BonJour, Chisholm, Alston, Quine, Kornblith, Williamson), which gives a student who goes on to read journal articles a map of who is arguing with whom.
• Compact. At about 290 pages the book is short enough to be read in a single term alongside articles.

Limitations

• Selective scope. The contents have no chapters on formal or probabilistic approaches to evidence, on epistemic value or on the epistemology of particular sources such as perception and memory; readers who need these must look elsewhere.
• Organised around specific authors. Since each chapter is built around particular positions in the analytic literature, readers get the most from it when they also read some of the original papers; a complete beginner may find the names and technical vocabulary (for example "apt belief", "mentalist internalism") arriving quickly.
• Revision history to keep in mind. Chapter numbering differs from the 2007 edition, so page references to the first edition do not carry over.

Where It Fits in the Course

Lemos sits in the middle of the epistemology course. Jennifer Nagel's Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction and Duncan Pritchard's What is this thing called Knowledge? are gentler first reads: the first is a short introduction to sceptical arguments and to what separates knowing from merely believing truly, the second is a textbook of short chapters with summaries, study questions and annotated further reading. Lemos covers a similar range of topics with more attention to the competing theories of justification.

Robert Audi's Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction is a more systematic textbook that moves from the sources of knowledge to its structure, analysis and scope, and is a natural companion when sources such as perception and memory are needed. Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology and Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits are specialist monographs; Lemos's Chapters 2 and 5 introduce the views they develop (knowledge-first epistemology and the apt-belief framework), so they are good preparation before those books.

How to Use This Book

The book suits undergraduates meeting epistemology for the first time and instructors who want a compact main text to pair with journal articles. No formal prerequisite is stated beyond willingness to follow philosophical arguments.

A practical plan for a one-term course:

• Core: Chapters 1–5. They give the traditional analysis of knowledge, the Gettier problem and the three main theories of justification (foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism and virtue epistemology).
• Next: Chapters 6–8. The internalism and externalism chapter reframes the debate of Chapters 3–5, Chapter 7 follows from the discussion of reliabilism, and Chapter 8 on skepticism can be read earlier if the course is organised around skepticism.
• Optional or by interest: Chapters 9–12. The problem of the criterion, the a priori and naturalized epistemology are largely self-contained; Chapter 12 suits courses with a social-epistemology unit.

Read each chapter with its main authors in mind and, where possible, pair it with one of the original papers named in the select bibliography.